µÀµÂÇé²ÙÂÛ The Theory of Moral Sentiments(µ¼¶Á×¢ÊÍ°æ)

Part ¢ñ Of the Propriety of Action

Section ¢ñ Of the Sense of Propriety

Chap ¢ñ Of Sympathy

Chap ¢ò Of the Pleasure of mutual Sympathy

Chap ¢ó Of the manner in which we judge of the propriety or impropriety of the affections of other men,by their concord or dissonance with our own

Chap ¢ô The same subject continued

Chap ¢õ Of the amiable and respectable ¢örtues

Section ¢ò Of the Degrees of the different Passions which are consistent with Propriety Introduction

Chap ¢ñ Of the Passions which take their origin from the body

Chap ¢ò Of those Passions which take their origin from a particular turn or habit of the Imagination

Chap ¢ó Of the unsocial Passions

Chap ¢ô Of the social Passions

Chap ¢õ Of the selfish Passions

Section ¢ó Of the Effects of Prosperity and Adversity upon the Judgment of Mankind with regard to the Propriety of Action; and why it is more easy to obtain their Approbation in the one state than in the other

Chap ¢ñ That though our sympathy with sorrow is generally a more l¢ôely sensation than our sympathy with joy, it commonly falls much more short of the ¢öolence of what is naturally felt by the person principally concerned

Chap ¢ò Of the origin of Ambition, and of the distinction of Ranks

Chap ¢ó Of the corruption of our moral sentiments,which is occasioned by this disposition to admire the rich and the great, and to despise or neglect persons of poor and mean condition

Part ¢ò Of Merit and Demerit; or, of the Objects of Reward and Punishment

Section ¢ñ Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit Introduction

Chap ¢ñ That whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude, appears to deserve reward; and that, in the same manner, whatever appears to be the proper object of resentment, appears to deserve punishment

Chap ¢ò Of the proper objects of gratitude and resentment

Chap ¢ó That where there is no approbation of the conduct of the person who confers the benefit,there is little sympathy with the gratitude of him who receives it: and that, on the contrary, where there is no disapprobation of the mot¢ôes of the person who does the mischief, there is no sort of sympathy with the resentment of him who suffers it

Chap ¢ô Recapitulation of the foregoing chapters

Chap ¢õ The analysis of the sense of Merit and Demerit

Section ¢ò Of Justice and Beneficence

Chap ¢ñ Comparison of those two ¢örtues

Chap ¢ò Of the sense of Justice, of Remorse, and of the consciousness of Merit

Chap ¢ó Of the utility of this constitution of Nature

Section ¢ó Of the Influence of Fortune upon the Sentiments of Mankind, with regard to the Merit or Demerit of Actions Introduction

Chap ¢ñ Of the causes of this Influence of Fortune

Chap ¢ò Of the extent of this Influence of Fortune

Chap ¢ó Of the final cause of this Irregularity of Sentiments

Part ¢ó Of the Foundation of our Judgments concerning our own Sentiments and Conduct, and of the Sense of Duty

Chap ¢ñ Of the Principle of Self-approbation and of Self-disapprobation

Chap ¢ò Of the love of Praise, and of that of Praise worthiness; and of the dread of Blame, and of that of Blame-worthiness

Chap ¢ó Of the Influences and Authority of Conscience

Chap ¢ô Of the Nature of Self-deceit, and of the Origin and Use of general Rules

Chap ¢õ Of the influence and authority of the general Rules of Morality, and that they are justly regarded as the Laws of the Deity

Chap ¢ö In what cases the Sense of Duty ought to be the sole of our conduct; and in what cases it ought to concur with other motives

Part ¢ô Of the Effect of Utility upon the Sentiment of Approbation

Chap ¢ñ Of the beauty which the appearance of Utility bestows upon all the productions of art, and of the extensive influence of this species of Beauty

Chap ¢ò Of the beauty which the appearance of Utility bestows upon the characters and actions of men; and how far the perception of this beauty may be regarded