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感知意向性:一个新进的胡塞尔式进路 The Intentionality of Perception:An Update 版权信息
- ISBN：9787308207706
- 条形码：9787308207706 ; 978-7-308-20770-6
- 装帧：一般胶版纸
- 册数：暂无
- 重量：暂无
- 所属分类：>>
感知意向性:一个新进的胡塞尔式进路 The Intentionality of Perception:An Update 内容简介
本书创新性地利用一种全新的胡塞尔方法来处理知觉意向性问题。作者论证了这种方法是合理的，即基于知觉内容是充实条件（perceptual contents are fulfillment conditions）的观点展开论述。借鉴德国有名现象学家埃德蒙·胡塞尔（Edmund Husserl，1859-1938）的思想，以知觉充
感知意向性:一个新进的胡塞尔式进路 The Intentionality of Perception:An Update 目录
Introduction
Part 1
1． Edmund Husserl's Thing and Space （First Segment）
2． Edmund Husserl's Thing and Space （Second Segment）
3． Edmund Husserl's Thing and Space （Third Segment）
Part 2
4． Problems of Perceptual Presence
5． Degrees of Presence
6． Action and Variation in Perception
Part 3
7． The Scope of Perceptual Contents
8． Seeing Distant Things
9． Consciousness and Perceptual Intentionality
Part 4
10． The Experience of Empty Space
11． A Perceptual Account of Fear
12． Perception and Instincts
13． The Two Visual Systems Hypothesis
Conclusion
Bibliography
Part 1
1． Edmund Husserl's Thing and Space （First Segment）
2． Edmund Husserl's Thing and Space （Second Segment）
3． Edmund Husserl's Thing and Space （Third Segment）
Part 2
4． Problems of Perceptual Presence
5． Degrees of Presence
6． Action and Variation in Perception
Part 3
7． The Scope of Perceptual Contents
8． Seeing Distant Things
9． Consciousness and Perceptual Intentionality
Part 4
10． The Experience of Empty Space
11． A Perceptual Account of Fear
12． Perception and Instincts
13． The Two Visual Systems Hypothesis
Conclusion
Bibliography
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感知意向性:一个新进的胡塞尔式进路 The Intentionality of Perception:An Update 节选
《感知意向性：一个新进的胡塞尔式进路（英文版）》： We now move on to Section 2， titled "Analysis of Unchanged Outer Perception". It consists of two chapters. Engaging in an analysis of the perceptual correlation， the discussion in Chapter 3 elucidates more the side of the experience， whereas Chapter 4 focuses on the side of the perceptual object. §14 provides various clarifications concerning the relation between the perception and the perceived. We are also given elucidations concerning the notion of space for the first time in the text. Husserl begins by pointing out that if we compare the content of the perception with the content of the object， we arrive at a broad distinction between what is sensed and what is perceived. For example， there is the sensed color， and then there is the perceived color， say， of the perceived house. We may likewise distinguish between the sensed roughness and the object's roughness， with the latter's being possessed of a form and structure in a way that the former is not. The sensed moments， e.g.， the sensed red， are real moments of the perception itself. The perception contains the moment the red， without being itself red， or having the property or feature of being red， unlike the perceived object. In particular， Husserl makes with emphasis on the important point that space is necessarily a form of things and not the form of lived experience. In this connection， he adds that the expression form of intuition， which might give one an impression to the contrary， is basically a misguided expression and thus even Immanuel Kant makes a mistake in speaking of space in this way. There do correspond， to sensed moments， perceived moments， but Husserl emphasizes that we are not merely naming the same item twice here. If the two were indeed the same， then we would effectively have two things， an immanent and transcendent one， and we could quite legitimately call the immanent item a thing. However， this cannot be an adequate view， Husserl believes， in particular， with a view to upcoming analyses that will demonstrate its counter-sensical nature. A consideration that particularly weighs against this view is that different perceptions can be perceptions of the same object， displaying itself from various sites. Likewise， this view would compel us to say that throughout different perceptions of uniformly colored yellow object， the coloration that appears to us would have to be uniform， but in fact， if we look at the immanent content of perception， we are bound to find different adumbrations of the color. What this strongly suggests is that the identity of objective features in no way signifies the identity of the relevant sensations. Sensation does not duplicate the object， as though it amounted to a kind of image of an object that itself counted as a second thing. In §15， Husserl importantly introduces the distinction between presentational contents and apprehension， arguing that the presentational contents by themselves amount to no more than dead matter， but the apprehension functions to animate them， so that they can begin to present aspects of the object. So， on the one hand， we have contents of sensation， which are real， but which do not add up to the entire content of a perception， since they do not suffice to give us an object， But since perceptions actually do present us with objects， it must be that they involve a kind of surplus， which can also be found really in the perception， and which first constitutes it as perception. It is this surplus that Husserl proposes to call the apprehension character， as he also claims that the contents of sensation undergo apprehension. Only when they do thus undergo apprehension， can we name the sensed contents presentational contents， by contrast with what is presented， namely the determinations of the object. Husserl further clarifies that the moment of apprehension is rightly distinguished from the moment of position-taking. Indeed， it does not necessarily require the moment of position-taking， with the upshot that it is possible for there to be apprehension but no position-taking， yielding the idea of a perception in a special sense. ……
感知意向性:一个新进的胡塞尔式进路 The Intentionality of Perception:An Update 作者简介
Kristjan Laasik，is an Associate Professor of Philosophy （as a ZJU100 Young Professor） at Zhejiang University， and has previously held positions as philosophy faculty at Shandong University， having earned his Ph.D in Philosophy from the University of Miami， USA， in 2011. He is originally from Tallinn，Estonia. His research focuses on the areas of perception and emotion， and in much of his work on these topics， he considers current debates from the point of view of phenomenology in the tradition of Edmund Husserl. In whatever spare time philosophy leaves him， he pursues interests in literature and culture， occasionally climbs the mountains around Hangzhou， plays tennis and chess.
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